Action detail
On 24 January 2011 the FSA imposed a financial penalty of £1,127,559 on Barclays Capital Securities Limited (the Firm, or Barclays Capital) for a breach of Principle 10 (Clients' assets) of the FSA's Principles for Businesses and Rules in the Client Assets sourcebook (CASS) which occurred between 1 December 2001 and 29 December 2010 (the Relevant Period). Specifically, Barclays Capital failed to segregate client money placed on GBP money market deposits intra-day in a segregated trust account, instead co-mingling the client money with its own funds throughout the Relevant Period. The funds were segregated overnight throughout the Relevant Period. The Firm agreed to settle at an early stage of the FSA's investigation. It therefore qualified for a 30% (stage 1) reduction in penalty, pursuant to the FSA's executive settlement procedures. Were it not for this discount, the FSA would have imposed a financial penalty of £1,610,799 on the Firm. The FSA views the failings as particularly serious because: 1. Barclays Capital has a leading market presence both in the United Kingdom and globally; 2. the failure to segregate and, therefore, adequately protect client money intra-day in accordance with the Client Money Rules remained undetected for over eight years; and 3. during the Relevant Period: a. the average daily amount of client money which was not segregated on an intra-day basis held on an annual basis increased from approximately £6 million in 2002 to approximately £387 million in 2009; and b. the highest amount held in the account and at risk at any one time was £752 million. Barclays Capital's failure to segregate client money intra-day for over eight years posed a significant risk of loss to its clients in the event that Barclays Capital became insolvent intra-day during the Relevant Period. If Barclays Capital had become insolvent intra-day there was the risk that its clients would have been classed as general unsecured creditors in the insolvency process rather than having the right to claim their money from a pool of protected client money. Further, in the event of Barclays Capital's insolvency, the co-mingling of client money and Barclays Capital's own funds would have hindered the ability to accurately trace client money. Consequently, the likelihood of such clients recovering their money in the event of the insolvency of Barclays Capital would have been reduced. Barclays Capital's failures therefore merit the imposition of a significant financial penalty. In determining the level of financial penalty, the FSA has taken into account a number of factors, including: 1. only one of the client money market accounts used by Barclays Capital was affected; 2. upon discovery of the issue by Barclays Capital, the Firm corrected the situation promptly; 3. Barclays Capital instigated a review of its compliance with Client Money Rules at its own initiative (the CASS Review); 4. the failure to segregate client money did not result in any incorrect financial reporting by Barclays Capital during the Relevant Period or in any loss to clients of Barclays Capital; 5. the FSA does not consider that Barclays Capital committed the breach deliberately or recklessly; and 6. Barclays Capital co-operated fully with the FSA during its investigation.
This reproduces the regulator’s published wording. It is not a summary and not an assessment.